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Telecommunications in the past constituted a tightly regulated, nationally oriented policy field. In 
economic terms it was characterized by closed national markets and few transnational interactions. 
Telecommunications are now developing towards an international market with minimal national 
regulation. Among the factors that contributed significantly to these changes, bold actions by the 
European Commission have to be mentioned. The actions consisted of recommendations, directives, 
programs and other activities, such as supportive statements by the European Court of Justice. 
Contrary to what is very often hinted at, however, it is not to be expected that on the European level a 
central state authority will develop, that resembles the old national regulatory and institutional 
structures. Rather a complex system of multi level governance is coming into existence which features 
not very clearly specified competencies and a mixture of private, para-public and public institutions 
with shared responsibilities. The present paper will both try to analyze recent trends in European 
telecommunications policy as well as assess the role of the European Commission. With respect to the 
latter it will be argued that the conceptualization of the Commission as a corporate actor signifies an 
important step forward in analyzing the Commission, but it is still a concept that needs further 
clarification. 
 
 
1. Restructuring Telecommunications: Analytical Perspectives 
 
 
The Treaty of Maastricht for the first time has mentioned explicitly a competence for the European 
Commission in the field of telecommunications. Telecommunications are dealt with under the heading 
of Trans-European Networks (Art. 129 b-d). Article 129 states that the Common Market might get 
additional stimulus through the development of trans-European networks for example in the field of 
telecommunications. In order to achieve these objectives, the Community (a) shall establish a series of 
guidelines covering the objectives, priorities and broad lines of measures envisaged in the sphere of 
trans-European networks; these guidelines shall identify projects of common interest; (b) shall 
implement any measures that may prove necessary to ensure the interopearability of networks, in 
particular in the field of technical standardization; (c) may support the financial efforts made by the 
Member States for projects of common interest financed by Member States, which are identified in the 
framework of the guidelines; the Community may also contribute through the Cohesion Fund to the 
financing of specific projects in Member States in the area of transport infrastructure. (a) requires the 
consultation of the European Parliament, the committee of the regions and the economic and social 
council. Guidelines will be adopted by a qualified majority vote in the council with the concerned 
member state(s) approving (codetermination procedure). In the cases (b, c) a qualified majority in the 
council is required based on the cooperation procedure (Art. 189c). Since Maastricht then the 
constitutional competence has been significantly broadened for the EU and institutional procedures 
have been outlined. It would be misleading, however, to think, that only from then on 
telecommunications policy is taking place at the EU-level and an understanding of telecommunications 
policy would require a close look at the negotiations between the governments of the member states 
leading to Maastricht. To the contrary: prior to Maastricht especially the Commission had already 
succeeded to expand its competencies in a dramatic manner - in spite of the fact that some observers as 
well as concerned actors (e.g. national governments) doubted its constitutional and political mandate. Telecommunications nowadays is treated as an area in which the policy guidelines are set in Brussels 
and not any longer in the European capitals. 
 
How did this extension of competencies come about? Especially what enabled the Commission to 
become successful in the 1980s after similar attempts have repeatedly failed during the 1970s? An 
answer to these questions has to take into account the overall changes in the telecommunications sector, 
that were to be observed over the 1980s. Meanwhile there is an important body of studies dealing with 
these processes. In the literature diverging hypotheses for explaining the changes are to be found. 
Bauer/Steinfield (1993) argue, that it was a combination of heightened public awareness among public 
elites (a), a dissatisfactory situation for equipment manufacturers, which had to cope with small, 
fragmented national markets (b), the breakdown of the Keynesian consensus and a loss of confidence 
in national regulation (c) as well as the emergence of a new world political economy (d). Dang et al. 
(1993:93) look beyond the structural features and argue, that the transformation was driven "by 
international institutions primarily concerned with promoting their institutional self-interest as 
corporate actors." Still others maintain, that the decisive factor, has been pressure coming from big 
corporate telecommunications users and their associations (Cp. Aronson/Cowhey  1988). Finally there 
are those who stress the importance of the prevalence of a neoconservative ideology in explaining the 
success of restructuring efforts (Cp. Duch 1991; Grande and Schneider, 1991). This is not the place to 
discuss the pros and cons of each of these explanations. The thesis of the present paper will be that in 
fact the Commission has played an essential role in the process of restructuring European 
telecommunications not the least, because it exploited very cleverly the situation of insecurity and 
change dominant in this field on the national level. 
 
 
2. The Development of European Telecommunications Policy: Don't say we haven't been busy! 
 
 
The origins of the successful strategy of the Commission can be traced back to the roundtable meetings 
organized by Davignon in the late 1970s. As it has been repeatedly described (Cp. Sharp 1989) a 
consensus among leading corporate managers and commission officials in some high technology 
sectors had evolved, that measures to strengthen the European industry in combination with the 
creation of an European market should be envisaged, especially in the field of information and 
communication technologies (ICT).  
 
Telecommunications could only be successfully targeted because it was subsumed under the doomsday 
imagery dominant in the evaluation of the whole ICT industry - in spite of the fact that the situation 
was quite special there. In the late 1970s there was no significant backlog compared to American and 
Japanese industry. In some parts of telecommunication, the European industry was even world leader 
(Cp. Woolcock 1984). Telecommunications on the other hand seemed to be a perfect target for public 
steering activities, since the telecommunications "market" was dominated by public decision making 
and state monopolies. 
 
Industrial policy motives were the main driving forces behind the Commission's strategy which 
decidedly had grasped the initiative and was writing communications and reports that were expressing 
the new consensus and tabled to the Council (see for example COM/79/65: The European Community 
and the New Information Technologies; COM/83/329: Communication on Telecommunications). The 
real initiatives started in 1983 and the phase until 1987 basically was concentrated on the development 
of policy proposals and programs and the attempts to get them passed by the Council. Three concepts 
were developed in these years: promotion of European interests in the telecommunications market, 
harmonization of technical and regulatory frame conditions, market liberalization. A second phase 
started with the Single European Act and the Green Paper on Telecommunications. The Green Paper of 
1987 (COM/87/290) was a widely underrated document at its conception, but it set the tone for the 
development of a full scale community telecommunications policy with a clear emphasis this time on 
market liberalization. With the Maastricht Treaty and the Bangemann Report (among other initiatives) 
a third phase might be beginning, in which the final assault on national regulatory competencies is 
launched by proposing and trying to establish a new European regulatory authority for telecommunications (a counterpart to the American Federal Communications Commission). On the 
other hand the Commission is again pushing stronger in the direction of industrial policy motivations, 
by planning to subsidize new infrastructures, the development of new applications etc. Billions of 
dollars are planned to be spent by the Commission in this domain. On September 29, 1994 the 
European Research Council for example passed specific programs on telematics applications of 
general interest (843 millions ecus) and information technologies (1,911 million ecus). 
For infrastructure purposes in the whole area of transeuropean networks 3 billion ecus are planned to 
be spent until 1999. 
 
The Commission no doubt has been successful in its attempts to enlarge its competencies. The 
formerly strictly national oriented telecommunications policy has been internationalized in virtually all 
areas (Fuchs 1993a). There is still national regulation of telecommunications, but it is not any longer 
the domain of telecommunications experts (technicians etc.) and it has been over-layered by 
international rules and regulations. In the process telecommunications regulation has become part of 
the more broader domain of economic and competition law.  
 
How does the regulatory architecture of telecommunications look like? The EU meanwhile establishes 
a framework for regulations and activities via its different Green Papers or by so called 
Communications. Green Papers and Communications usually are accompanied by a "Resolution" of 
the Council.  
 
Green Paper on the Development of the Common Market for Telecommunications Services and 
Equipment Com (87) 290; C 257/1 
Green Paper on a Common Approach in the Field of Satellite Communications in the EC Com (90) 
490 
Green Paper on a Common Approach in the Field of Mobile and Personal Communications in the 
European Union Com (94) 145 
Green Paper on the Liberalization of Telecommunications Infrastructure (Part One) Com (94) 440 
 
Figure 1: Green Papers in Telecommunications 
  
 
Directives are legally binding for the member states, but the implementation of the Directives is left to 
the individual administrations, which gives them plenty room for discretion.  
 
 
Directive on the Initial Stage of the Mutual Recognition of Type Approval for Terminal Equipment 
(86/361/EEC, OJ 217/21, 24.7.1986) 
 
Directive on the Frequency Band to be Reserved for the Coordinated Introduction of Public pan-
European Cellular Digital Land-Based Mobile Communications in the EC (87/372/EEC, OJ L 196/85; 
25.6.1987) 
 
Directive on Competition in Markets in Telecommunications Terminal Equipment (88/301/EEC, OJ L 
131/73, 27.5.88) 
 
Directive on the Electromagnetic Compatibility Harmonization (89/336/EEC, L 139/19, 3.5.1989) 
 
Framework Directive on Open Network Provision (90/387/EEC, OJ L 192/1, 28.6.90) 
 
Directive on Competition in Markets for Telecommunications Services (90/338/EEC, OJ L 192/10, 
24.7.90) 
 
Directive on Public Procurement for Supply and Works Contracts in Telecommunications and other 
Sectors (90/531/EEC, OJ L 297/1, 17.9.90) 
 Directive on the Frequency Bands Designated for the Coordinated Introduction of pan-European Land-
Based Public Radio Paging in the EC (90/544/EEC, OJ L 310/28, 9.10.90) 
  
Directive on Procurement Procedures of Entities Operating in the Water, Energy, Transport and 
Telecommunications Sectors (90/531/EEC, OJ L 297/1, 29.10.90) 
 
Directive on the Approximation of the Laws of the Member States Concerning Telecommunications 
Terminal Equipment Including the Mutual Recognition of their Conformity (91/263/EEC, OJ L 128/1 
29.4.91) 
 
Directive on the Frequency Band to be Designated for the Coordinated Introduction of Digital 
European Cordless Telecommunications (DECT) (91/288/EEC, OJ L 144/47, 3.6.1991) 
 
Directive on the Approximation of the Laws of the Member States Concerning Telecommunications 
Equipment, Including the Mutual Recognition of their Conformity (91/263/EEC, OJ L 128/1. 23.5.91) 
 
Directive on Remedies, Corrective Mechanisms and Conciliation Procedures in Relation to 
91/531/EEC (92/13/EEC, OJ L 76/14, 25.2.1992) 
  
Directive on the Application of Open Network Provision to Leased Lines (92/44/EEC OJ L 165, 5.6.92) 
 
Directive Coordinating the Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to the 
Application of Community Rules on Public Procurement Procedures of Entities Operating in the Water, 
Energy, Transport and Telecommunications Sectors, (92/50/EEC, OJ L 209/1, 18.6.92) 
 
Directive on the Coordination of Procurement Procedures for Supply, Services and Work Contracts in 
the Water, Transport and Telecommunications Sectors, (93/38/EEC, OJ L 199/84, 14.6.93) 
 
Directive on Supplementing Directive 91/263/EEC in respect to Satellite Earth Station Equipment 
(93/97/EEC, OJ L 290/1, 29.10.1993) 
 
Directive on Services and Terminals Open to Competition (94/46/EC, OJ L 268/15, 13.10.94) 
 
Directive on the Application of the Open Network Provision to Voice Telephony (COM (92) 247 final 
- SYN 437, 27.8.92; vetoed by the European Parliament) 
 
Directive on the Mutual Recognition of Licenses and other National Authorizations for 
Telecommunications Services, Including the Establishment of a Single Community 
Telecommunications License and the Setting Up of a Community Telecommunications Committee 
(Com (92) 254 final - SYN 438, 15.7.92; First Reading in Parliament completed) 
 
Directive on the Reservation of Frequencies for Digital Short Range Radio (91/C189/15, OJ C 189/14, 
First Reading in Parliament completed)  
 
Directive on Mutual Recognition of Licenses (Com/93/652 final, First Reading completed) 
 
General Directive on Data Protection (COM/92/422 final, pending) 
 
Directive on Data Protection and Privacy in Digital Services (COM/90/314 Final SYN 288, OJ 
C277/04, pending) 
 
Figure 2: Important Directives on Regulatory Issues of Telecommunications in the European 
Community 
 
 Equally legally binding are Decisions, which, however, are only binding to the specific addressees of 
the measures. A case in point would be the introduction of an international access code (92/264/EEC, 
OJ 137/21, 11.5.1992) or the exemption of agreement between Irish Telecom and Motorola setting up 
a radiopaging service company. More generally decisions are especially made with respect to a breach 
of the rules of competition or the abuse of a dominant position. The number of decisions has grown 
over the years reflecting the more advanced state of telecommunications regulations, but also the 
increased competencies of the Commission. 
In spite of the fact that recommendations and opinions are not binding to the member states, they 
nevertheless might exercise an important influence. In the beginning of its activities the 
Recommendations and Communications to the Council were the most widely used policy instrument 
of the Commission. In 1986 the ISDN-Recommendation on the development of a common European 
telecommunications network was passed (86/659/EEC), which formed the basis for an ongoing 
cooperation and coordination between the main actors and which resulted in a de facto introduction of 
ISDN in all member states (except Greece) in 1993 (Cp. also Fuchs 1993b). 
 
With the help of these and other initiatives, the Commission is well on its way to create an open and 
competitive market for telecommunications equipment, it is working towards a progressively opening 
of national markets to a competitive supply of value-added services and it is pressuring for a further 
curtailing of the power of existing telecommunications administrations to use their regulatory authority 
to constrain competition in services or equipment. The formulation of important parts of 
telecommunications policy became transferred to international institutions, which for example are 
engaged in an ex-ante standardization of network technologies and services (cp. the European 
Telecommunications Standards Institute). National standardization prepares international 
standardization and is complementing it. The space for a meaningful national standardization is 
growing ever smaller. 
 
 
3. Balanced or Unbalanced Strategic Orientations? 
 
 
This all sounds like a true success story and in part this impression is justified. The complaints of the 
defenders of national sovereignty, that the Commission has already gone too far  as well as the 
demands of the free market supporters, that the Community is still far behind what it is supposed to be 
doing, cannot be measures for judging the activities of the Commission. Nevertheless the activities of 
the Commission are not as straightforward as they seem to be at a first inspection.  
 
It is typical for the measures in telecommunications that they feature an important inconsistency, a 
strategic uncertainty on the side of the Commission. On the one hand the Commission and most 
recently again the outgoing Commission President Jacques Delors have stated that building pan-
European network infrastructures is a top priority. Plans for these infrastructures usually have been 
worked out and are still being worked out with the help of public authorities and the old network 
operators, i.e. the non-privatized, more or less state owned telecommunications administrations. 
Furthermore the renewed interest in universal service obligations2 seems to strengthen the position of 
the old incumbent actors.   
 
On the other hand most of the various Green Paper activities, directives etc. issued by the Commission 
try to support a liberalization of markets and a weakening of the status of the same old network 
operators. The Commission is in some way aware of the problem. It actually says, that its aim is "..to 
ensure an appropriate balance between harmonization and liberalization in the Community 
telecommunications policy." (ECSC-EC-EAEC 1994: 5) The question is, whether there is actually a 
balance or whether rather murky compromises are sometimes achieved and contradictory policy aims 
are being formulated.  
 
This becomes most prominent in the case of the development of telecommunications infrastructures. 
The Commission has stressed the importance of European infrastructures since the beginning of its 
involvement in telecommunications. And the actors most able to develop these infrastructures and willing to cooperate with the Commission are the public network operators and their preferred 
suppliers, telecommunications equipment manufacturers like Alcatel in France or Siemens in Germany. 
The expert groups engaged in developing the early telecommunications initiatives were clearly 
dominated by these groups. Liberalization on the other hand aims at reducing the power and influence 
of these traditional actors. A good example for this conflict has been the Commission's ISDN-initiative, 
which threatened to fail because of this split (Cp. Fuchs 1992). The ISDN plans closely mirrored the 
interests of the public network operators and equipment manufacturers, but privatized network 
operators, user groups, computer manufacturers and free market ideologists for a long time were 
strictly against any mission oriented telecommunications network planning. The line of conflict is still 
to be seen today: claiming that universal service must be preserved, the Council of Ministers intends to 
wait until 1995 to even put the question of network infrastructure competition on the table. The 
Commission went along, knowing that if some member states get their way nothing will change well 
beyond the year 2000. Now the Commission's directorate is proposing an interim solution. A draft 
directive suggests separate treatment for existing and future infrastructure. At the urging of the 
European Parliament, DG IV proposes to allow cable TV companies to use their existing infrastructure 
to offer all telecoms services other than switched voice, beginning next year (1995). The Commission's 
telecoms directorate, DG XIII is weighing whether railways and utilities should be permitted to offer 
users alternative infrastructure. 
 
The different strategies - more liberalization vs. a positive and constructive approach - are pursued and 
supported by different parts of the Commission. The lines of conflict go between Directorates as well 
as through the Directorates themselves. Besides the discussions about the chances of an industrial 
policy orientation, there is a connected debate, whether a concentration of communications and support 
on the classical industrial giants or on other forms of project management, which link - in a network 
like manner - small, potentially more dynamic units is the more advisable way to proceed. These 
diverging concepts on policy design are not only supported by different factions in the Commission, 
but also by different national administrations and departments. The Competition Directorate is looking 
upon telecommunications as just one economic sector among others and wants to treat it in an 
analogue manner. Implying that in telecommunications there is still much to do to dismantle the old 
regulatory regime. Statements by the Telecommunications Directorate on the other hand tend to stress 
the specific situation in the telecommunications sector, which needs special treatment and highlight the 
importance of the availability of a common, state of the art infrastructure all over Europe as well as the 
overall economic significance of developments in telecommunications. It is difficult to find a statement 
of the Competition Directorate, that is for example in favor of the Commission's ISDN 
recommendation, which on the other hand forms an important cornerstone of GD XIII's 
telecommunications strategy. Of course there is also a systematic reason for some of the 
inconsistencies of EU policies. In contrast to Germany, Great Britain or the USA, the European Union 
has no central "legislative drafting office," that at least tries to ensure some consistency. The 
directorates work very much on their own and central coordination is weak. 
 
 
4. The Corporate Actor Perspective 
 
 
These strategic inconsistencies and changes in emphasis lead to the question whether the Commission 
or even more so the European Union can be treated as an actor in its own right. Traditionally European 
institutions are not treated as actors with independent resources, powers, action capacities and 
institutions, but rather as passive environment (norms, rules, frameworks). "European policy making is 
primarily analyzed in terms of state-centric interaction with governments aggregating and representing 
national politic and economic interests thus widely neglecting the existence of both genuine European 
interests, which have to be enforced in national political arenas, and a wide variety of national and 
European actors which need to be coordinated and concerted in European policy-making." (Dang u.a. 
1993: 94/95). 
 
Based on this critique, international institutions should be treated as units acting on their own behalf 
with specific self interests. This approach has been extended in works that consider the EU to be a 'corporate actor.' Schneider/Werle (1989:423) view the EU as an actor which is restricted in its actions 
by the veto-powers of member governments, but at the same time it is also an actor that is bestowed 
with significant supranational competencies, powers and resources. A corporate actor comes into 
existence, if and when individual resources (law, money) become transferred to an organizational unit 
by its component parts. By that this new organization is empowered to act in a described area in place 
of its 'founders'. Once institutionalized, the new actors are not simply aggregating individual interests 
and are transferring them to a new level. The new corporate actor develops interests of its own, 
oriented first of all towards its own survival and well being. Once a new actor unit has been established 
the possibility is there, that processes of autonomization start to work, which might put the 
organization beyond the immediate reach and interests of its subunits. At some point it may become an 
'autonomous actor which defies the intentions of its creator(s).' (Flam 1990:5) 
 
The Commission derives (formal) power within the EU from two sources: powers granted under the 
treaty and its amendments and control of the legislative program of the Council, the EU's ruling body. 
The latter control allows the Commission to determine, within limits, the content and the timing of EU 
legislation. It gives the Commission opportunity for diplomatic manoeuvering that Commissioners and 
the Directorates can exploit. The Council, however, makes the final decisions, and may amend the 
proposed legislation. Submission of directives for Council authorization is the standard procedure 
under Article 100a of the Treaty; such directives are usually referred to as Council directives. The 
Commission is also empowered by the Treaty to issue directives on its own authority, without 
reference to the Council, in its role of policing EU trade for such treaty violations as cartels and abuse 
of dominant market position or special concessions. The Commission is vested with this power under 
Article 90, which deals with public undertakings and those with special or exclusive rights, and 
includes as a subcategory undertakings of general economic interest or having the characteristics of a 
revenue-generating monopoly. The European Court of Justice gets its special role in combination with 
the mandate of the Commission in the field of competition policy. Directives as those on terminal 
equipment and services are rooted in the Treaty of Rome provisions espousing competition in goods 
and services. The directives merely attempt to implement the provisions in a way that is consistent 
with the goals of the Treaties and is specifically focused on the equipment and services sector. 
However, two additional aspects of the Treaty are important to point out: 
 
First, in Article 90, it is specifically permitted to the European Commission to issue directives directly 
to member states in order to ensure the application of competition policies to public undertakings or 
situations where member states grant exclusive privileges. Second, Articles 85 and 86 prohibit various 
forms of anti-competitive behavior within the Community, including agreements that may effect trade 
(such as price fixing) and any abuses of a dominant position. Both of these points have been 
instrumental in influencing the shape and pace of telecommunications reform above and beyond the 
general legislative processes outlined in previous sections. 
 
With regard to the first point, the Commission relied on the provisions in paragraph 3 of Article 90 to 
issue the following directives: Non-Public Voice Services Open to Competition (90/388/EEC), the 
Terminal Equipment and Services Directives (94/46/EC), Terminal Market to be fully opened 
(88/301/EEC) and in October 1994 the Satellite Directive to the member states. The use of Article 90 
is not without its problems. Although not disagreeing with the substance of the directive on terminal 
equipment, France deeply opposed the use of Article 90 to bypass the need for review and approval by 
the Council of Ministers on such an important topic. France appealed, along with Belgium, Italy, 
Germany, and Greece, to the European Court of Justice to have the directive annulled. France wanted 
to force the Commission to submit future directives to the Council of Ministers. The Court, however, 
upheld the Commission's right to issue the directive in question. The decision stressed the specifics of 
the terminal equipment directive and not so much the general procedure. Nevertheless, as a result a 
similar case against the Services directive did not materialize, and the Commission's efforts to speed 
the reform process were strengthened. 
 
The 'corporate actor' approach seems best to captur e the impression, that the EU acts proactive based 
on a program of its own, which is not identical with aims of the member states or of some few of them, nor simple an aggregation in the sense of a smallest common denominator. These two results one 
would expect after reading the bulk of literature written on decision making in the European Union.  
 
But may be this approach still not going far enough. An in depth analysis would have to dissect the 
actor 'Commission' even more and apply also the results of recent writings on the state apparatus. 
Hesse has called the state a poly-centric actor, a multi-organizational system (Hesse 1987: 79). He 
wants to highlight the development, that in spite of the fact that there seems to be something like an 
actor 'state', it hardly acts in a consistent and directing manner. The state or better the state apparatus 
consists of a variety of levels, is engaged in a variety of actions and hardly follows consistent aims or 
interests over time in spite of its institutional stability. This holds also true for the case of 
telecommunications and the EU as a political system of special quality. The Commission's material 
objectives have changed significantly over time. The emphasis of the Commission in the beginning 
was more industrial policy oriented and became more and more oriented towards deregulation and 
liberalization. Furthermore different groups within the EU support differing strategies. There is not 
only a successive shift of political priorities, but also conflicting factions and groups within the 
Commission with conflicting priorities. In this sense the EU cannot be even interpreted solely in terms 
of a two-level game (Putnam 1988) in which national and EU-interests represent different but 
nevertheless consistent levels, but rather as a multilevel game exercised by a network of networks. 
Neither the Commission is a consistent actor, nor the member states. 
 
For Germany it has been repeatedly noted in the literature that a 'national' EU policy is hardly visible. 
It is a sectoralized policy with countervailing interests of the states of Germany. The EU-level can be 
used in a strategic manner by national groups to achieve results not amenable on the national level. 
These interests, however, need not be national interests, but those of (trans)national interest groups. In 
a more advanced state of policy development and with multiple interest groups at the EU level, it 
becomes more and more difficult to speak about national interests. This can be easily exemplified by 
the aforementioned ETSI example, where transnational coalitions exist, but also by the fact that 
national actors might have increasingly diverging interests. In telecommunications the interests of the 
national network operators and the national regulatory authorities which were more or less identical in 
the past are beginning to diverge. Meanwhile the official spokesman of German national interests, the 
ministry of posts and telecommunications, has on many issues opinions opposite to those of the new 
German Telekom as network operator (with a monopoly in the field of voice telephony), which, 
however, is also considered to be a representative of national interests. 
 
 
5. Policy-making in a System of Multi-Level Governance 
 
 
Even some of the propagators of the corporate actor concept meanwhile seem to deny, that a corporate 
actor involves the image of an actor with a somewhat consistent strategy. Judging by the light of this, 
the common element to be detected beyond all the differing, sometimes contradictory activities of the 
Commission is a conscious effort to extend the prerogative of the Commission and the institutions 
related to it. Under this aspect it is secondary whether a strengthening of industrial policy motives or a 
strengthening of liberalization issues dominates. In both cases the Commission at the end will be in a 
stronger position by either developing new regulations or a regulatory framework for a liberalized 
common market or by its more mission oriented activities to develop a specific network or specific 
applications. This is not supposed to sound like conspiracy theory, it could also be called enlightened 
institutional self-interest. 
 
The idea of the EU as a system of multi-level governance, nevertheless, might be more useful in 
capturing the manifold, often unstructured and fragmented activities going on at the European level. 
Networks and levels of conflict and cooperation then can be named as follows (Cp. Peters 1992):  
 
(a) The national governments and the Commission, in which problems of national sovereignty and 
national interest predominate. Generally member states are not as such willing to implement the 
Commission's directives. In the case of the directive on Open Network Provision, Belgium for example promised in letters to the Commission to implement the directive, but has never publicized the letters 
in Belgium and at the moment does not plan to so, which leads to a de jure implementation, but a de 
facto non-implementation. Spain is promising implementation for years, but steers a course of 
piecemeal implementation and gradual concessions to the Commission, that put the final 
implementation in a distant future.  
(b) The Commission and single (sub)national units dealing with problems of progress in integration. 
With respect to the Open Network Provision, individual companies can appeal to the Commission and 
the Commission in return can act against national actors or regulatory authorities.  
(c) The Commission and the other European institutions dealing with priorities in the integration 
process. The Council for example can decide on a schedule on for introducing competition in the 
telecommunications sector, but the Commission can also do its best to accelerate the roll out of 
competition e.g. by using the Courts, which is not in the interests of some member states. Remember 
also in this context the new role of the European Parliament as an opponent of the Commission in 
telecommunications regulation. 
(d) The internal fragmentation of the Commission dealing with problems of regulatory authority, 
competencies and appropriate strategies. Most prominently in this respect are the conflicts about 
industrial policy and mission oriented activities. 
(e) The Commission and its relations to European, transnational as well as national interest groups 
dealing with mutual support and influence peddling.  
(f) The international level on which the Commission acts in negotiations with non-EC members or 
international organizations like GATT.  
 
Usually policies are conducted in a parallel manner on different levels with mutually reenforcing or 
disintegrating effects. These levels are not stable, but are shifting and are interlocked. The debate for 
example between the Commission and the European Parliament has been started only recently in a 
dramatic manner. The parliament has refused to accept the Commission's ideas on the liberalization of 
voice telephony, by making a procedural and a material point. Procedurally the parliament wants to be 
more involved in the development of European telecommunications regulations and materially, it is 
dissatisfied with the emphasis of the Commission on liberalization issues - at the expense of universal 
service obligations, the interests of residential telephone users and social policy aims. The parliament's 
injunction was based on the Maastricht Treaty and marked the first time that the Parliament has 
stopped a telecommunications initiative. 
 
Generally the way of the Commission to manage the different levels is by constructing Euro-centric 
networks. In 1983, the Commission created a Task Force on Information Technology and 
Telecommunications to develop the emerging consensus into an active policy approach. In 1984, the 
Senior Officials Group on Telecommunications (SOG-T), attended by representatives of the member 
states' telecommunications operators, was created to advise the Commission on all aspects of 
telecommunications, thus establishing a major link to the national policy authorities. Along with SOG-
T operated the GAP (Groupe d'Analyses et de Prévision) which featured representatives from the 
network operators, equipment manufaturers, regulatory authrorities and consultants. In addition, the 
Senior Officials Group on Information Technology Standards (SOGITS), the Senior Officials Advisory 
Group for the Information Market, special committees within the RACE and ESPRIT programs, and a 
great number of other groups - such as the ESPRIT Round Table of Industrial Companies, the 
Standards Promotion and Application Group (SPAG), and the European Workshop for Open Systems 
(EWOS) - were established as formal and informal networks for European policy coordination. In the 
area of standardization in cooperation agreements with CEPT (European Conference of Post and 
Telecommunication Administrations) and CEN-CENELEC, the Commission linked with the existing 
bodies of trans-European cooperation in telecommunications in 1984. For purposes of standardization 
and based on an EEC proposal, CEPT created a new body, the Technical Recommendations 
Applications Committee (TRAC), in 1984 and, four years later - after only unsatisfactory results had 
been achieved in the eyes of the Commission -, the European Telecommunications Standards Institute 
(ETSI). In ETSI network operators, research institutes, equipment manufacturers, user associations etc. 
are equally represented. In this sense ETSI signifies an important step towards opening up the political 
arena for new actors. Other institutions newly created encompass a European Numbering Office and an 
institution for conformance testing.   
Parallel to these developments, the Commission is engaged in building up/or supporting interest groups, 
that might be instrumental for the success of Commission initiatives. A case in point would be the 
Information Technology User Group (INTUG) or the European ISDN User Forum (EIUF). The latter 
is totally financed and administered by the Commission. Nevertheless it gives recommendations to the 
Commission as a representative of user interests.3 The Commission has turned to user organizations 
like those mentioned, realizing that the traditional actors in telecommunications (network operators, 
equipment manufacturers) had only a limited interest in opening up closed national markets and 
develop European solutions. The user groups are often instrumentalized by the Commission for its 
aims. 
 
The networks being constructed by the EU are not usually restricted to supranational and international 
actors, but tend to incorporate key actors from national policy arenas as well. EU policy networks are 
thus hybrid mixtures of national, supranational, intergovernmental, transgovernmental and 
transnational actors and interrelationships. The membership of the High-Level Group on the 
Information Society again is a case in point. It existed of a number of carefully selected individuals 
from industry, politics and the research community. Membership in these networks is voluntary, 
formally or (more often) informally regulated. In spite of their seemingly unplanned and often 
confusing character, the Commission spends considerable time and effort to create a network of formal 
institutions with formal membership status. Nevertheless the networks under construction seem to be 
more pluralistic than many national ones. 
 
6. A European Communications Commission? 
 
In September 1983 the Commission had put forward to the Council of Ministers six action lines in 
telecommunications. Since then, substantial progress has been achieved with the various Green Papers, 
the Open Network Provision (ONP) Framework Directives, the other directives, recommendations, 
communications, decisions and resolutions, of which only the most important ones could be mentioned 
in this article. Besides there are related programs like STAR, RACE and new institutions like the ETSI. 
The Commission is continuing to monitor and promote telecommunications throughout the 
Community.  
 
Unlike in other areas of EU-policy making this program is still being accelerated. The following figure 
gives an overview of the areas in which the European Commission tries to have policies on the table 
before the end of 1996. 
 
Regulatory Issues: 
Infrastructure liberalization 
Standardization, interconnection and interoperability 
Tariff policy for universal service obligation 
Promotion of "Global Information Society" 
Intellectual property rights (IPR) 
Electronic protection, legal protection and security 
Pluralism in media ownership 
Alternative networks for non-reserved services 
Audiovisual networks, basic services, applications and content 
Satellite and mobile communications, applications, 
content 
 
Figure 3: Areas in which the European Commission plans to have policies before the end of 1996 
Source: European Commission, CommunicationsWeek International 26/9/94 
 
 
In the foreground of the activities are still the issues of liberalization and deregulation. With the 
support of the Courts, action in this area is far easier to achieve and more rewarding than actions that 
require a positive compromise say on the content and regulation of universal services (Cp. Figure 4).  
1993  Corporate Networks 
1994  Green Paper on mobile and personal communication 
1995  Green Paper on network infrastructure and cable TV networks 
1996  Proposed new framework for the full telecom liberalization in 1998 covering items such as: 
 o  tariff  restructuring 
 o  price  caps 
 o  access  charges 
 o  universal  service  obligation 
  o  enhanced rights of interconnectivity for competitors 
1998 total liberalization of voice services (Luxembourg in   2000; Spain, Portugal, Greece, 
Ireland in 2003) 
 
Figure 4: Deregulation plans of the Commission 
 
 
The aforementioned High Level Group recommended in June 1994 the establishment at the European 
level of an authority whose terms of reference would require prompt attention. It thinks it necessary to 
develop: "...a single regulatory framework valid for all operators, which would imply lifting unequal 
conditions for market access. It would also ensure that conditions for network access and service use 
be guided by the principle of transparency and non-discrimination, complemented by practical rules for 
dispute resolution and speedy remedy against abuse dominance." (High Level Group 1994:3 ) 
 
A European FCC - and this is what this statement aims at - is hotly debated at the moment, both its 
desirability as well as its chances for becoming reality. The Corfu summit stated that it is necessary to 
set up a permanent coordination instrument to ensure that the various parties involved - public and 
private - are working along the same lines. The coordination instrument, to be set up as soon as 
possible, should be based on the appointment in each Member State of a person responsible at the 
ministerial level for coordinating all aspects of the subject (political, financial and regulatory) with a 
view inter alia to ensuring a co-ordinated approach in the Council.  
The report of the High Level Group (often referred to as the Bangemann report) urges European 
governments to cede their sovereignty over telecommunications and broadcast policy to a pan-
European body as part of a plan to embrace competition rapidly -ahead of the 1998 deadline set for 
voice telephony competition. As a European counterpart to the American FCC the new agency would 
rule on issues such as operator's licenses, tariffs, and interconnection among networks. Piecemeal 
deregulation will hold Europe back, the report says: "Time is running out. If action is not accelerated, 
many benefits will arrive late or never." 
 
In the eyes of both industry and the Commission the logic for a new European institution becomes ever 
more compelling, even with resistance against a new institution coming from national governments 
like Germany, as transnational alliances overtax independent, national regulatory bodies. The case for 
a Communications Commission is without any doubt more strongly supported by industry, that is big 
industry, which is also behind the Bangemann report, then by the governments. But this has been a line 
of division somewhat typical for the whole development of telecommunications policies. In the 
beginning of the involvement of the Commission in telecommunications there was not a statement by 
the Council or member governments, but also a report by a group of high level experts. In this sense 
there is a certain continuity, that again highlights the strategic capabilities of the Commission as well 
as the fact, that the national governments are not sitting in the driver's seat in this policy field. 
 
But nevertheless there is an important issue that needs more attention. The EU could advance into the 
territory of telecommunications, not the least because in the last decade national regulations have 
proved to be out of step with an increasingly internationalizing telecommunications sector. On the 
international level the need for cooperation, coordination and binding regulations (especially in the 
fields of standardization) has been repeatedly voiced by the main actors in the policy field - not so 
much by the national governments. What has not been achieved so far on the European level is the 
establishment of an authority with power to actually enforce European regulations. The development of such an institution, however, would be the next logical step in the development of 
telecommunications policy. In this respect there is a evidence for the old neofunctionalist arguments. A 
European market for telecommunications needs European rules and regulations, even if the national 
governments are not willing to concede them. The pressure is coming from those actore, who are 
active on the European market. 
 
It should also be clear, however, that an European Communications Commission would not create a 
structure similar to those which the European nation states have developed in the last decades. But the 
question of a new regulatory institution is critical, because the problem of the binding character of 
agreements is still unresolved. There are European standards, but no institution with the power to 
enforce them. The creation of a new regulatory institution could also allow the Commission to avoid 
the impression shared by the European Parliament, that it concentrates on deregulation and 
liberalization issues and that it is omitting the part of a constructive, positive regulation. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
 
Scharpf has recently concluded with respect to politics in general: 
" If politics wants to arrive at an efficient solution of inner-societal and global problems, then this will 
hardly be achieved by sovereign decision making, but above all by the cooperation in pluralist, 
corporatist and inter-governmental bargaining systems, in transnational regimes and in international 
organisations." (Scharpf 1993:165). The typical mode of arriving at problem solutions in these cases 
cannot be via a hierarchical decision by an individual actor or by a simple majority vote in one specific 
arena. The typical mode of dealing with problems in supra- and transnational politics are talks between 
participants, which possess a significant degree of autonomy and veto power. (Scharpf 1993:166) The 
situation in telecommunications offers plenty of illustration for this evaluation. It also leads us to two 
questions: Is it sensible to expect the development of a European super-state or super-bureaucracy? Do 
the new European institutions in telecommunications have a democratic deficit? 
Scharpf's quote implies answers to both questions. A convincing theory of democracy for governing in 
bargaining and multi-level systems is not available. The developments on the European level, however, 
only highlight a problem that is also visible on the national level: the cooperation and bargaining 
procedures defy the traditional concepts of representative democracy. The developments on the 
European level have to be interpreted in the broader context of the development of "governing" in 
complex societies. 
 
Contrary to general belief it has to be stressed once again, that the Commission possesses a relatively 
small staff of bureaucrats -equalling the number of employees for middle sized cities in Germany. A 
new European superbureaucracy, if there should be one, is at least singinificantly different from the 
national ones. 
Given the numbers the Commission does little rigorous fact finding before deciding what to do and 
what costs will be involved in its actions. The usual way to proceed is to gather expertise from the 
member states for the development and the writing of policy proposals. The success of the proposals 
are in part linked to the artfulness of selecting the right people for this purpose. Initial drafting of 
proposals is frequently done by technocrats, who may be superb specialists, but frequently lack the 
necessary ability to draft convincing regulations. Commission lawyers might review the technocrats' 
drafts, but often do not have the time and resources to effect essential changes. The fate of the data 
protection initiative is a good case in point. The character of EU-regulations is not so much owed to 
the predilections of the Commission, but owed to the way of their formulation in a network like 
process. 
 
This is not to imply that everything is well on the European level and that we only have to find new 
concepts for analyzing it adequately. Access to the policy formulation process at the European level is 
pluralistic, but is does not ensure that actually a wide array of interests are being represented. The 
Commission has an open tendeny to talk with well organized, big interest groups. Furthermore the 
tendency to concentrate on issues of deregulation and liberalization, leaves the part of a positive development of policy goals underdeveloped. Questions like for whom are the new networks and 
applications actually being designed, what kind of concept of public interest is being pursued and a 
rigorous debate on the design of new regulatory institutions is still missing. 
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